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1BIntroduction 
Recent increases in foreclosure rates in New England and other parts of the United States are raising 
concerns.  Distressful for individual borrowers and potentially destabilizing for their communities, 
the negative effects of foreclosures flow beyond the impact on housing markets and the financial 
consequences for creditors.  Public officials, lenders, current and potential homeowners, community 
organizations, and other stakeholders are paying careful attention.  
 
In low- and moderate-income communities in New England, community leaders view current trends 
as especially worrisome.  Among possible explanations, they stress the expansion of high-cost and 
subprime lending in these communities; and they cite aggressive or unscrupulous mortgage practices, 
and even mortgage fraud.  Historically, however, other factors have been responsible for foreclosure 
activity.  Regional job losses, rising interest rates, weak housing markets, and stretched borrowers 
facing negative life events are among the factors that usually push up foreclosure rates.  And even 
critics of current mortgage lending practices acknowledge that homeownership is an effective asset-
building strategy and that expanding the availability of credit to previously underserved population 
groups is a worthy goal.   
 
This paper describes recent trends in New England foreclosure rates, discusses possible causes, and 
looks at the prevalence of foreclosures in Massachusetts cities and towns with significant 
populations of low- and moderate-income households.  It finds that the prevalence of higher cost 
lending is associated with higher foreclosure rates.   
   
2BCurrent Patterns 
Foreclosure rates in both New England and Massachusetts are rising, as shown in Figure 1.  In the 
third quarter of 2006, the foreclosure rate for Massachusetts was 0.42 percent.  The rate for New 
England was essentially the same (0.41 percent).  In both cases, rates have risen over the past three 
years.  Foreclosure rates remain lower than in the early 1990s, when the region experienced a severe 
recession, accompanied by a sharp real estate downturn and a banking crisis.  Foreclosure rates in 
Massachusetts and New England were also below the foreclosure rate of 0.47 percent for the 
country as a whole, but the difference has narrowed. 
 
Throughout the paper, the term “foreclosure rate” refers to loans entering foreclosure process—that 
is, mortgages where foreclosure proceedings were initiated, but not necessarily completed.  
Unfortunately, data are not readily available that are comparable across year and geography for 
completed foreclosures.  Also, the initiation of foreclosure may be a better measure of financial 
distress, because many homeowners facing foreclosure will sell their property at a loss before the 
foreclosure is completed.  For U.S. and state-level estimates, data are from the Mortgage Bankers 
Association’s National Delinquency Survey.  The “foreclosure rate” is calculated as mortgages with 
foreclosures initiated as a percent of total mortgages serviced.  
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Figure 1: Foreclosure Rates, United States, New England, and Massachusetts, 1979-2006 (Q3) 
Foreclosures initiated in quarter as a  percentage of loans  
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association/Haver Analytics 
 
 
3BWhy Are Foreclosure Rates Rising? 
When examining foreclosure trends, analysts generally look at three issues: employment, interest 
rates, and the housing market.  A homeowner’s ability to keep up on mortgage payments depends 
upon the household’s income stream and the size of the mortgage payments.  When a homeowner is 
unable to cover payments, sale of the home may be the best option for avoiding foreclosure and 
this, in turn, depends upon conditions in the housing market.  
 
12BJob losses 
Job losses are perhaps the most common cause of increased foreclosures, but their contribution to 
the recent rise in foreclosures is not clear.  Nationally, employment has been growing steadily since 
2003, although the regional pattern of foreclosures, with higher rates in the East North Central 
states, may reflect widespread cutbacks in the auto and related industries.  But in New England, 
including Massachusetts, jobs have been increasing since 2003—a year with low foreclosure activity. 
 
13BRising mortgage payments 
Making mortgage payments also becomes difficult if the required payment increases.  Until recently, 
this was rarely an issue in most of the United States, because the preponderance of homes was 
mortgaged with fixed-rate products where the monthly payment was the same for the entire 
duration of the loan.  However, since the 1990s, products featuring changing monthly payments 
have grown increasingly popular.  These can include adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), where 
monthly interest rates and payments size are linked to some index, such as the prime rate; or 
products with features like “teaser rates” where initial interest rates are low, but are set to increase 
after fixed time periods.  While some ARMs are structured to have only moderate shifts in monthly 
















The weakening housing market has likely played a strong role in the recent foreclosure increase.  
Since 2004, rates of housing price appreciation in Massachusetts and New England have slowed 
dramatically, and by some estimates, property values have declined.  In strong housing markets, 
homeowners who become economically strained and unable to make their mortgage payments can 
avoid foreclosure by selling their homes and paying off their mortgages.  Alternatively, they may be 
able to refinance and apply some of the increase in equity to their mortgage payments.  In weak 
housing markets, homeowners often lack these options, because debt on a home may exceed the 
market price.  Even if a homeowner can expect enough from a sale to cover outstanding debt, 
homes generally take longer to sell in weak markets.  
 
The increased popularity in recent years of mortgages that allow homeowners to make minimal 
downpayments and then make only minimal interest payments, with the interest differential folded 
into the loan outstanding, raises concerns that more homeowners are either unable or unwilling to 
withstand the soft housing market.  
 
15BChanging product mix 
The recent rise in foreclosures in New England and Massachusetts can be traced to changes in the 
composition of mortgages originated, and specifically, the rising popularity of higher-risk loans.  In 
addition, foreclosure rates for subprime ARMs have risen dramatically in the past year.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 2, which compares foreclosure rates for major categories of conventional 
mortgages, subprime mortgages have always had much higher foreclosure rates than prime 
mortgages, both nationally and in Massachusetts.  (In this paper, “conventional” refers to mortgages 
that are not insured by a government agency, such as the Federal Housing Administration [FHA], 
Veterans Administration [VA] or the Rural Development Services.)  In the past few years, the share 
of loans outstanding that are subprime, particularly subprime ARMs, has risen dramatically.  
 
Prime fixed-rate loans, the lowest risk category, declined from over 80 percent of outstanding loans 
to under 70 percent, as shown in Figure 3.  Meanwhile, subprime ARMs, the highest risk category, 
grew from one percent of U.S. loans outstanding in 2000 to nine percent at the end of 2006.  The 
share of conventional mortgages entering foreclosure that was subprime ARMs grew from nine to 
49 percent.  Figure 4 highlights these dramatic differences. 4 
Figure 2: Foreclosure Rates by Product Group, United States and Massachusetts, 1998-2006 (Q3) 
Foreclosures initiated in quarter as a percentage of loans 
 




Figure 3: Product Group Market Share, United States and Massachusetts, 1998-2006 (Q3) 
Conventional product market share 
 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association/Haver Analytics 
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In Massachusetts, not only has the fraction of mortgages in the subprime adjustable category 
increased, but in addition, the foreclosure rate for subprime ARMs has also risen very rapidly.  Over 
3 percent of subprime ARMs for properties in Massachusetts entered foreclosure proceedings in the 
third quarter of 2006 (Figure 2).  While subprime ARMs accounted for only 7 percent of 
conventional loans in Massachusetts (Figure 3), they accounted for 56 percent of conventional loans 
entering foreclosure (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: Product Group Market Share and Share of Loans Entering Foreclosure, United States and 
Massachusetts, 2006 (Q3) 
Conventional product share of market and foreclosures 
 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association/Haver Analytics 
 
 
4BSubprime Lending and Foreclosures in Massachusetts Communities 
In Massachusetts, local foreclosure rates vary widely.  Figure 5 shows foreclosure rates across the 40 
largest cities and towns.  The highest foreclosure rates were observed in Brockton, Springfield, and 
Lawrence.  Those familiar with Massachusetts will recognize that many of the communities with 
high foreclosure rates are among the poorest towns and cities in the state.  While the poorest areas 
have had higher than average foreclosure rates for the past three years, the differences were at first 
modest.  In the past year, however, the gaps have widened markedly.  Thus, not only have 
foreclosure rates gone up, but they have gone up most in the poorest communities (Figure 6). 
 
Foreclosure rates for cities and towns are constructed as the number of foreclosure initiations filed 
at Massachusetts registries of deeds per 1,000 housing units estimated in the 2000 Census.  
Sensitivity tests comparing alternative denominators, including owner-occupied units and 
population, showed similar patterns. 
 


































MA Market MA Foreclosures6 
 
Figure 5: Variation In Local Foreclosure Rates, 2003 and 2006 



























Figure 6: Foreclosures by Poverty Quintile, Massachusetts Cities and Towns, 2003-2006(Q2) 
Foreclosures initiated in quarter per 1,000 Housing Units, Massachusetts Towns by Poverty Quintile 
 
 
Note: Within quintiles, averages are weighted by each city or town’s total number of housing units. 




















































































































































































































































































































































Higher rates of foreclosures in Massachusetts communities are also correlated with the prevalence of 
higher cost lending.  Data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) in 2004 
include information on higher-cost loans, which can be used as a proxy for subprime lending.  In 
these analyses, the measure of a community’s higher-cost lending is the dollar volume of higher-cost 
loans as a percentage of the total dollar volume of loans.  With the median foreclosure occurring 
two to three years after the loan is made, the 2004 vintage of loans would approach peak foreclosure 
risk in 2006-2007.  As shown in Figure 7, below, the correlation between higher-cost lending and 




Figure 7: Foreclosure Rate, by Level of Higher-Cost Mortgage Lending for Massachusetts Cities and Towns, 
2006 (Q3) 





Note: Restricted to first-lien, nonbusiness mortgages on owner-occupied, site-built, single-family housing units.  For loans 
secured by first liens, higher-cost loans had annual percentage rates (APRs) exceeding comparable Treasury securities by 
three or more points.   
Source: ForeclosuresMass, Corp., Census 2000, HMDA 2004 
 
 
Since higher cost lending appears to be more prevalent in lower income communities, the question 
arises whether the link between higher cost lending and foreclosures is really a link between income 
and foreclosure.  To shed some light on this, cities and towns were categorized according to their 
levels of both higher-cost lending and poverty.  Figure 8 shows that higher foreclosure rates were 
more closely associated with higher-cost lending than with high levels of poverty—in fact, within 
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Figure 8: Foreclosures by Poverty and Higher-Cost Lending, Massachusetts Cities and Towns, 
2003-2006 (Q3) 
Foreclosures initiated in quarter per 1,000 Housing Units, by Higher-Cost Lending and Poverty 
 
 
Note: ‘More’ and ‘Less’ are measured as top two or bottom two quintiles.  Within quintiles, averages are weighted by each 
city or town’s total number of housing units.   
Source: ForeclosuresMass, Corp., Census 2000 
 
 
5BLooking Ahead: Will Foreclosure Rates Continue to Rise in 
Massachusetts? 
Given the popularity of higher-risk mortgage products and the softening of the housing market, 
further increases in foreclosures are likely.  As noted, foreclosure rates are much higher for subprime 
mortgages, especially subprime ARMs, than for other conventional mortgage types.  Given the 
normal lags between mortgage origination and the period of highest risk of foreclosure, the peak has 
yet to arrive.  (Phillips and VanderHoff, 2004).  Moreover, with the housing market softening and 
prices flattening and even declining in some communities, borrowers will have more difficulty 
extricating themselves from too-expensive loans than they would have a year or two ago.  
Refinancing may not be an option, unless there is significant equity in the home; and selling may 
take time and may not yield enough to cover the mortgage.  Potential job losses from construction 
cutbacks are a further concern in communities where construction is a significant employer. 
 
6BForeclosure Prevention 
Early intervention is the key to preventing foreclosures.  This can involve counseling and education, 
legal advice and support, specialized or subsidized loan products, regulatory responses, or other 
creative efforts, such as programs to help support declining neighborhood home values.  This 
section looks at what might help homebuyers during three stages of intervention: pre-purchase, 
post-purchase, and after initiation of foreclosure.  Though this paper does not specifically address it, 
regulation also plays an important role.  Many states have passed forms of predatory lending 









Q2-03 Q3-03 Q4-03 Q1-04 Q2-04 Q3-04 Q4-04 Q1-05 Q2-05 Q3-05 Q4-05 Q1-06 Q2-06 Q3-06
Less Poverty/More Higher-Cost (n=23)
More Poverty/More Higher-Cost (n=89)
Less Poverty/Less Higher-Cost (n=89)
More Poverty/Less Higher-Cost (n=25)9 
 
There are many informational and counseling resources available to help potential homebuyers 
before purchase.  Such programs typically start by helping individuals determine whether buying a 
home makes sense for them.  These programs address important considerations such as credit 
history, ability to maintain a stable income, and assumptions about costs, taxes and fees.  When 
talking specifically about loans, these programs outline the process, the various costs and fees and 
emphasize the need for potential homebuyers to shop around, to read and understand the loan 
terms, and to understand basic rights and responsibilities.  They also talk about ways to avoid 
mortgage fraud.   
 
Some counseling programs are combined with state or federal loan programs, often supported by 
government agencies, approved community development organizations, and faith-based groups.  
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) sponsors counseling agencies that 
can guide homebuyers.  Their approved list combines government, nonprofit, and for-profit 
counselors, and is available on the HUD website www.hud.gov.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both 
have online calculators and tools designed to guide a potential homebuyer through a purchase 
decision, and provide information about counselors.  In Massachusetts, homebuyers utilizing certain 
loan programs are required to take homeownership counseling courses.  Low- to moderate-income 
homebuyers using the state’s ‘Soft Second’ loan program can use a list of Mass Housing Partnership-
approved homeownership counselors.  For ten years, the Citizen’s Housing and Planning Authority 
(CHAPA) has been supporting an educated homebuyer before their purchase, granting a ‘seal of 
approval’ to a list of approved homebuyer counseling agencies.  Many financial institutions also have 
homebuyer education programs.  The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston recently produced a 
brochure, Know Before You Go  …To Get a Mortgage, that provides a simple guide to new mortgage 
products.  Based upon the HUD list, the Bank also provides a list of HUD-approved counselors on 
the website HUwww.bos.frb.orgUH under ‘Consumer’.  The Federal Reserve Board’s website also contains 
links to valuable resources about taking out a home purchase loan.  
 
Some mortgage products for homebuyers carry lower risk.  For instance, the MyCommunity 
mortgage is a fixed-rate product developed and financed by Fannie Mae, serviced by Mass Housing, 
and originated through approved lenders.  The MassAdvantage mortgage offers fixed interest rates, 
below standard market-rates, and is financed by MassHousing through approved lenders.  Both 
products work to pre-empt foreclosures by combining flexible underwriting guidelines and low 
down payments with low fixed rates and state-sponsored low-cost mortgage insurance.  
MassHousing also offers an affordable loan product for purchasing a home in need of rehabilitation 
and repair.  These particular products are not for everyone, as they are subject to certain income 
limits, and borrowers must have a satisfactory credit history.  Visit www.masshousing.com for more 
details and to access their homebuyer resources.  
 
Many resources apply post-purchase as well.  Borrowers who are finding it difficult to make their 
mortgage payments, and who are contemplating re-financing, may be tempted to commit to even 
higher costs loans, hoping their situation improves in the future.  Many states have public 
information campaigns like Boston’s “Don’t Borrow Trouble,” which seeks to educate families and 
individuals about how to avoid predatory lending frauds and about available community resources.  
The “Don’t Borrow Trouble” campaign has a hotline at 617-635-HOME (4663), which is a 
trustworthy place for Boston residents to call before signing documents that put homes at risk.   
Massachusetts residents can call a state mortgage hotline at 1-800-495-2265, extension 1501.  Local 
community organizations can also provide help.  For example, ESAC Boston maintains a 10 
Sustainable Homeownership Center, where residents of Boston’s Egleston Square can turn for 
assistance.  Several members of the Massachusetts Association of Community Development 
Corporations (MACDC) also provide such services (HUwww.macdc.orgUH). 
 
 
7BWhy Foreclosures Matter 
 
It is painful and demoralizing for borrowers to lose their property to foreclosure.  In addition to losing their asset, 
defaulting homeowners’ credit is damaged, negatively affecting their credit rating for years to come.  As a result 
of foreclosure, the homeowner might have a hard time relocating, and the adverse credit effects may cost him or 
her money down the line.  It is estimated that a foreclosure costs the lender about $59,000 and takes 18 months to 
resolveF
1
F (Cutts and Green [2004] citing Focardi [2002]).  Foreclosures also can destabilize entire neighborhoods by 
negatively affecting property values and reducing tax revenues. 
 
One important study estimates that a single-family property within one-eighth of a mile of a foreclosure suffers a 
decline in property value of roughly 1 percent (Immergluck, Smith. 2005).  According to the same study, even 
foreclosures between one-eighth and one-quarter of a mile can cause a decline of about one-third of 1 percent.  
Because of the revenue effect from lower assessed values, many foreclosures cost the city or town as well.  In 
Chicago, the roughly 3,800 foreclosures that occurred in 1997 and 1998 cost the city between $600 million and 
$1.4 billion in cumulative citywide loss in poverty value (ibid., 2005).  These estimates were conservative, as they 
included only the effects of foreclosures on single-family property values and did not include the effects on the 
values of condominiums, larger multifamily rental properties, and commercial buildings (ibid., 2005). 
 
The pernicious effect of foreclosures matters even more in low-income neighborhoods.  When they looked closely 
at the city of Boston, the authors of the study found that many of the foreclosures were located in these 
neighborhoods, and had a significant negative effect (ibid., 2005).  In fact, foreclosures in low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods had an even greater negative effect on single-family property values than in a typical 
neighborhood.  A single-family property in a low- or moderate-income community within one-eighth of a mile of a 
foreclosure saw an estimated decline in property value between 1.4 percent and 1.8 percent (ibid., 2005).  For 
example, owners of a hypothetical single-family property worth $200,000 and located in a low- and moderate-
income neighborhood, would experience an average loss of between $2,800 and $3,600. 
 
Foreclosures may even contribute to rising crime rates.  High foreclosure rates have a statistically significant 
effect on overall neighborhood crime (Immergluck and Smith. 2006), and contribute to higher levels of violent 
crime.  Every three foreclosures of 100 owner-occupied properties in one year correspond to an increase in 
neighborhood violent crime of approximately 6.7 percent (ibid., 2006).  Certainly, the presence of run-down or 
boarded-up properties that occur as a result of foreclosure can have negative effects. 
 
Finally, in terms of investor or public perception, the higher foreclosure rates may stigmatize an area as a poor 
place for non-housing-related investment.  Business owners look for positive signs of business-related activity when 
undertaking site selection.  Other investors also seek positive signs of economic activity when developing retail or 
mixed-use projects.  Foreclosures may have a dampening effect on investment potential, even in the presence of 
positive characteristics like an underserved market.  
 
 
After foreclosure is initiated, options narrow but borrowers need to know that the first step is to get 
help.  According to NeighborWorks America, about half of homeowners enter into foreclosure 
proceedings without having made contact with their mortgage lender.  Most lenders do not want to 
foreclose.  Many foreclosure prevention programs assist individuals facing foreclosure caused by a 
temporary financial crisis.  The programs may provide case management services and, if applicable, 
mortgage payment, or other financial assistance on a one-time basis.  Some lenders are taking steps 
to shift existing customers from the highest-risk products to more stable mortgages.  MassHousing 
and others are offering refinance products with financing exceeding 100 percent loan-to-value ratios 
                                                 
1 Corrected from previous version posted March 2007. 11 
for some borrowers.  Other lenders may allow ‘short sales’ of homes--a sale for less than the value 
of the loan that allows the borrower to avoid foreclosure and its harmful effects upon credit history; 
such sales may also allow the lender to cut their losses (WSJ 2007).  Here again, community 
organizations may be able to provide one-on-one counseling that can help.  In some cases, legal 
advice is helpful.  In Massachusetts, nonprofit legal services may be able to help homeowners 
understand their rights and chart a way forward. 
 
8BConclusion 
Foreclosure rates have risen sharply in Massachusetts and New England. This rise is attributable to 
both increased take-up of higher-risk loan products and rising foreclosure rates for these products.  
Public officials and community groups are moving to address the issue through greater consumer 
awareness and education campaigns, evaluating proposed legislation, and discussions of possible 
rescue loan products.  Getting help quickly remains the key for homeowners in trouble. 12 
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